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Abstract 
In the context of responses to the Covid-19 pandemic, the paper examines the African 
regional regime for public health crises and disasters. Using the combined analytic lenses 
of Capability Approach, Institutional Theory, Constructivism, New Regionalism Approach 
and Actor Network Theory, it focuses on the opportunities offered by, and limitations of, 
the African Union legal order. 
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I. African Union, Public Health and Covid-19 
 
entered the mainstream of the current global discourse, as exemplified by resolutions 
2002/31 and 2005/24 of the Commission on Human Rights and resolutions 6/29, 15/22 
and 24/6 of the Human Rights Council. An African Union (AU) coordinated approach to 
public health crises, however, emerged only recently in the regional order. It took some 
time for the AU to concretise the wish in the preamble to its Constitutive Act for addressing 
at confront our continent and peoples in the light of the social, 
health is further buttressed by references in Article 3(n) and other objectives enumerated 
in Article 3(k),(j),(m) of the Constitutive Act.  
 
Nonetheless, just like any other public institution,1 
may be inter-linked with its ability to undertake effective crisis management, particularly 
the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic that presents unprecedented challenges. Although the 
incidence of infections and deaths are relatively low in Africa compared to trajectories in 
some parts of the world, Covid-19 potentially disproportionately affects African countries 
due to peculiar circumstances such as inadequate public health infrastructure and weak 
economies. In addition to health impacts, the World Bank reported that Covid-19 could 
potentially cause  and social  to African countries through 
considerable reductions in commodity trade and export prices, foreign investments and 
remittances, tourism and travel disruptions, and constraints on economic activities from 
lockdowns and restrictions.2 Covid-19 also constrains the debt repayment and servicing 
ability of African countries many of which are already part of the Highly Indebted Poor 
Countries debt relief programme of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF offered 
19 African countries debt relief in the sense of freezing interest payments for six months.3 
1 The Politics of Crisis Management: Public 
Leadership under Pressure (Cambridge: CUP, 2005); OECD, The Changing Face of Strategic Crisis 
Management (Paris: OECD, 2015).  
2 Ceasar Calderon, Gerard Kambou, Calvin Z. Djiofack, Megumi Kubota, V. Korman and Catalina Cantu 
-19 and Policy Responses in Sub-
 (April), (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2020). 
3 April 
2020. 
 
Against the backdrop of Covid-19, this paper therefore examines the African regional 
4 
authority, legitimacy and power that are inextricably connected to the way in which crises 
5 Using the combined analytic lenses of Capability Approach, 
Institutional Theory, Constructivism, New Regionalism Approach and Actor Network 
Theory, the paper focuses on the opportunities offered by, and limitations of, the AU legal 
- 6 of its 
existence.  
 
The key pan-African body for tackling Covid-19 is the Africa Centres for Diseases Control 
and Prevention (ACDC). Following the 2014-2016 Ebola epidemic in West African 
countries, the 26th Ordinary Assembly of AU Heads of State in January 2016 agreed to 
establish the ACDC as a specialised technical institution permitted by Article 9(1)(d) and 
Article 14 of its Constitutive Act. Launched on 3 January 2017, the ACDC aims to enhance 
evidence-based collaborative interventions and programmes for rapid and effective 
disease detection and response.7 In addition to working with AU member states, the ACDC 
operates five regional collaborating centres for Central, Eastern, Northern, Southern and 
Western Africa which appear to reflect existing sub-regional political and economic 
groupings. 
 
The ACDC produced a continental Covid-19 strategy document on 5 March 20208 
prioritising the limitation of transmission and minimisation of harm from social and 
economic disruptions. As such, ACDC outlined twin objectives of coordination with 
partners within and outside Africa and promotion of evidence-based practices which are 
implemented mainly through the operational units of the Africa Task Force for Coronavirus 
by Article 3(n) of the AU Constitutive Act include Partnership for Evidence Based 
Response to COVID-19 (PERC) and Institute Pasteur Dakar, Senegal. The Institute, which 
studies viral pathogens, is the co-lead of  laboratory and subtyping working 
group.9 Furthermore, in collaboration private organisations, the AU and ACDC launched 
the Africa Covid-19 Response Fund to raise US$150 million for transmission limitation 
measures and US$400 million for procuring equipment and supplies, deploying rapid 
responders and supportin 10  
4 Christopher Ansell and Martin Bartenberger, Pragmatism and Political Crisis Management: Principle and 
Practical Rationality during the Financial Crisis (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2019), 4. 
5 
(ed), Crisis Management. Volume III, (London: Sage, 2008), 84 104, 100. 
6 Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising International Law: Development, Economic Growth and the Politics of 
Universality (Cambridge: CUP, 2011). 
7  https://africacdc.org/about-us/
May 2020, https://africacdc.org/our-work/. 
8 -  last modified 5 March 2020, 
https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/38264-doc-africa_joint_continental_strategy_for_covid-
19_outbreak.pdf. 
9 -19 Continental Response with ACDC, 
accessed 7 May 2020, https://africacdc.org/news-item/wellcome-and-dfid-support-africa-covid-19-
continental-response-with-e-2-26-million/. 
10 
April  2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/04/15/the-coming-of-age-of-the-africa-
centers-for-disease-control/. 
 
To facilitate the implementation of the continental strategy, the ACDC in conjunction with 
the AU Commission launched the Partnership to Accelerate COVID-19 Testing (PACT): 
Trace, Test & Track (CDC-T3)11 for strengthening testing capacities with a view to testing 
10 million Africans by October 2020.  PACT is complemented by a surveillance protocol12 
issued by the ACDC to inform Covid-19 detection by AU member states and a detailed 
stepwise guidance.13 Differentiated in Phase 0 (no Covid-19 case) and Epidemic Phases 
1 (early stage outbreak), 2 (expanding outbreak), 3 (advancing outbreak) and 4 (outbreak 
with nationwide transmission),  the stepwise guidance also contains helpful definitions of 
key terminologies such as contact tracing, social distancing, isolation and quarantine. The 
ACDC regularly provides outbreak briefs, fact sheets, brochures and policy updates14 and 
provides manuals, guidelines and framework documents on assessment, monitoring and 
movement restrictions,15 community social distancing16 and contact tracing,17 and 
recommendations on meetings and travel.18 
 
-19 
policy directions. PERC reported that most African governments swiftly imposed public 
health and social measures.19 
president rejected social distancing and other ACDC guidelines and even encouraged 
economic and religious activities involving large gatherings of people.20 President Magufuli 
-19 cases were 
exaggerated and supporting an unproven Madagascan herbal remedy.  A few other African 
countries have placed orders for the product. The AU sought the technical data of the 
11 -
ACDC,  last modified 21 April 2020, https://africacdc.org/news-item/african-union-and-africa-centres-for-
disease-control-and-prevention-launch-partnership-to-accelerate-covid-19-testing-trace-test-and-track/. 
12 -Like Illness Surveillance 
for COVID-  accessed 7 May 2020, file:///F:/38350-
doc%20protocol%20for_enhanced_sari_and_ili_surveillance_for%20covid-19%20in%20africa_eng.pdf. 
13 -
accessed 7 May 2020, https://africacdc.org/download/recommendations-for-stepwise-response-to-covid-
19/. 
14 
https://africacdc.org/our-work/. 
15 essment, Monitoring, and Movement Restrictions of People at Risk for COVID-
-19-and-resources/guidelines-policies/covid-19-
and-resources/guidelines-policies/africa-cdc-guidance-for-assessment-monitoringand-movement-
restrictions-of-people-at-risk-for-covid-19-in-africa-pdf/detail.  
16 -
http://www.africacdc.org/covid-19-and-resources/guidelines-policies/covid-19-and-resources/guidelines-
policies/africa-cdcguidance-on-community-social-distancing-during-covid-19-outbreak-pdf/detail. 
17 -
http://www.africacdc.org/covid-19-and-resources/guidelines-policies/covid-19-and- resources/guidelines-
policies/detail. 
18 -
March 2020 http://www.africacdc.org/covid-19-and-resources/guidelines-policies/covid-19-and-
resources/guidelines-policies/africa-cdc-policy-recommendation-for-african-union-meetings-and-travel-
during-covid-19-outbreak-pdf/detail. 
19 -  5 May 2020, 
https://preventepidemics.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/PERCRegional5-6-2020.pdf, 6. 
20  
unproven21 herbal remedy from Madagascar for efficacy and safety review by the ACDC22 
Research that produced the remedy have not addressed the request nor shared the data 
with anyone else.23 
demonstrate the need for considering African traditional remedies within the framework of 
public health capacity and capability in addition to enhancing the self-confidence of public 
and private research organisations and promoting regional collaboration and coordination.    
 
The public health visibility and coordinated approach of the AU acting through the ACDC 
contrasts sharply with its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity. While the OAU 
24 
achievement in areas such as good governance and development. Nonetheless, this 
emergent interest in continental public health coordination appears to mask deep structural 
and institutional limitations impeding African countries and the regional order to overcome 
public health challenges and resultant socioeconomic consequences. The following 
capability questions:  
 
Since 2003, the volume, velocity, and variety of travel between the rest of the world and Africa has 
increased dramatically, which will result in initial and continuous introductions of infected persons 
from areas with COVID-
relatively fragile health systems, concurrent epidemics of vaccine-preventable and other infectious 
diseases, inadequate water, sanitation, and hygiene infrastructure, population mobility, and 
susceptibility for social and political unrest during times of crisis.25  
 
II. Situating Capacity and Capability 
 
To understand the drivers of public health capacity and capability, the Actor-Network 
Theory may be useful as it suggests that society is a complex and fluid diversified collection 
of relationships and alliances.26 Society is shaped not by predetermined and fixed systems 
but by contingent and potentially transformative interaction of actors and events. One 
lessons from the Actor-Network Theory is consideration of dynamic social relations and 
events to gain understanding of society which suggests the need for investigating wider 
political and socioeconomic dimensions of crisis management in the AU regional order and 
their intersection with public health.  Accordingly, the following structural and institutional 
capability. 
 
 
21 . 
22 -19: African Union in discussions with Madagascar over 
2020, https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20200504/covid19-african-union-discussions-madagascar-over-
herbal-remedy. 
23 - al Brief, 13 May 2020, 
https://www.medicalbrief.co.za/archives/au-silence-greets-madagascar-presidents-claims-of-covid-19-
cure/; Aryn B
https://time.com/5840148/coronavirus-cure-covid-
organic-madagascar/. 
24 Jean 
Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series 1-12, 3. 
25  
26 Bruno Latour, Re-Assembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory (Oxford: OUP, 2005). 
a) Funding 
 
While it has made some progress, the ACDC requires more funding and resources in 
addition to the need to establish it autonomous operational and execution capacity to 
promote public health.27 n many 
African states where political and economic institutions have persistently failed to develop 
public health capacity through improved funding.  This is reflected in the varied picture of 
Covid-19 responses by AU member states. Countries like South Africa28 responded 
relatively quickly and instituted public health and social measures but some others have 
been impeded in their responses by minimal capacity.29 
 
Instructively, the AU 2001 Abuja Declaration required 15 percent of annual national 
budgets to be ringfenced for health, however only one country met the target in 2011 and 
many others remained a long way behind.30 The average per capital health budget of 34 
31 These 
levels of health spending make it almost impossible to procure and maintain public health 
facilities and equipment and employ healthcare professionals. No wonder Africans 
constitute a significant proportion of health professionals in the West,32 a brain drain on 
 
 
b) Good governance 
 
Lack of good governance is another self-induced debilitating factor. The role of corruption, 
for instance, as being 33 with adverse 
impacts on public health34 and other development indicators in African states is widely 
acknowledged. Initiatives like the AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption 
 Peer Review Mechanism 
have had modest success in changing the governance profiles. While Article 3(g) of AU 
Constitutive Act refers to good governance, efforts should be undertaken by the AU to 
more than symbolic.  
 
A new approach is necessary to curtail prebendalism,35 patrimonialism,36 corruption and 
other impediments to good governance in African countries. To this end, the AU may 
27   
28 Andrew . 
29  
30 
https://www.who.int/healthsystems/publications/abuja_report_aug_2011.pdf?ua=1. 
31  2020, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/pledging-
conference-to-help-africa-fight-covid19-by-abiy-ahmed-2020-05.  
32 -
Explora Insight on Africa 103-111; 
 accessed 7 May 2020, https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2016-march-
2017/diagnosing-africa%E2%80%99s-medical-brain-drain. 
33 
Trade, Domestic Institutions Intl & Comp L Q 127, 161. 
34 
 
35 Richard A. Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second 
Republic (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
36 Anne 
 (2009) 52(1) African Studies Review 125. 
formulate a good governance code enjoying equal status as the nascent continental 
aversion to unconstitutional takeover of government expressed in Article 4(p) of its 
Constitutive Act. A public health good governance code may include matters such as 
minimum health spending as a percentage of GDP, tax transparency, promotion of public-
private partnerships, prohibition of health tourism by public officials and genuine distaste 
for corruption and illicit financial flows. The existence of such a code can provide a 
benchmark for African people to assess and compare the performance of governments. 
Public officials or governments violating the code may be penalised, for example, through 
sanctions.  
 
c) Dependence   
 
While the Ebola experience attests to the potential ability and initiative of African countries 
to tackle public health crises, the region intriguingly appears to lack the necessary self-
confidence resulting in a habit of dependence on others.   This dependence is epitomised 
ssistance.37 He also sought 
assistance for African countries in the Global Health Pledging Conference starting on 4 
May 2020.38 The Africa Covid-19 Response Fund launched by the AU and the ACDC 
similarly relies on external donations. 
 
The ACDC does not seem different in approach notwithstanding that the Institute Pasteur 
Dakar, Senegal pioneered the isolation of the yellow fever causing arbovirus.39  For 
example, PERC, which to support evidence-based Covid-19 responses, is a partnership 
between the ACDC and a private initiative (Resolve to Save Lives), multilateral agencies 
(World Health Organisation and World Economic Forum), external public health agency 
(UK Public Health Rapid Support Team) and private market research and data analysis 
companies (Ipsos and Novetta Mission Analytics). The lack of involvement of African 
organisations in PERC suggests the need for a more confident regional approach towards 
developing capacity and capability.   
 
To move away from dependence, it is important to recall that 
the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than 
material forces, and that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by 
40  Likewise, the New Regionalism 
below and from within the region itself, and more in accordance with its peculiarities and 
41  An attitudinal change is therefore imperative. The AU can, for instance, step 
up in facilitating funding of inter-institutional collaboration between African and foreign 
researchers. 
 
 
 
37   
38 
https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/newsroom/news/2020/05/05-04-2020-coronavirus-global-response-
international-pledging-event. 
39   
40 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: CUP, 1999), 1. 
41 Politeia  6-21, 7. 
 
d) Coloniality and neoliberalism 
 
development profiles,42 the Covid-19 pandemic confirms a long-standing attitude of African 
states to look up to former colonial powers for solutions to socioeconomic problems despite 
years of political independence. Apart from Ethiopia, African countries were colonised by 
Wester
establishment of the ACDC was facilitated by external institutions, notably the 
regional health body by 2013.43 The ACDC is loosely modelled after the European Centre 
for Disease Prevention and Control, an agency of the European Union which, in turn, 
provided the template44 for the AU. 
 
-19 containment measures seem to mirror that of Western European 
countries.  Lockdowns imposed by African governments, for example, did not quite 
consider unique socioeconomic circumstances like the dominant informal economy, non-
existent social welfare and inadequate power and internet infrastructures. Concerns 
include the impact of social distancing measures on the informal sectors and urban poor45 
and exacerbation of gender, education and social inequalities.46 The reality is highlighted 
in a PERC survey of residents of 28 cities in 20 African countries which reported significant 
food shortages and financial difficulties if lockdowns were imposed for 14 days or more.47  
 
Related to coloniality is the adoption of neoliberal orientations by African states which 
resulted in social welfare and infrastructural deficits. The IMF-devised Structural 
Adjustment Programme imposed on African countries is a particularly harmful neoliberal 
48 including significant funding 
healthcare gaps. Neoliberal developmentalism49 has clearly not improved the fortunes of 
African economies.  
 
42 Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (London: Bogle L-Ouverture, 1972); Peter E. Ekeh, 
Comparative Studies in 
Society and History, 91-112. 
43 -China Collaboration in Creating and Supporting the Africa Centres for Disease 
https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/china/trs-04-us-china-collaboration-africacdc.pdf. 
44 -9, 11 (n. 24). 
45 
Microentrepren https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/04/09/social-
distancing-unlikely-to-hold-up-in-africa-without-a-safety-net-for-microentrepreneurs/; Zachary Barnett-
uld Low-Income Countries Impose the Same Social Distancing 
Guidelines as Europe and North America to Halt the Spread of COVID-
https://som.yale.edu/sites/default/files/mushifiq-howell-v2.pdf. 
46 -
https://www.globalpartnership.org/news/joint-
solidarity-letter-african-union-impact-covid-19-girls-education-and-child-marriage. 
47  
48 ACME: An International Journal for Critical 
Geographies 285 292, 285. 
49 
Sustainable Development Goals: Law, Theory and Implementation, ed. Duncan French and Louis J. Kotzé 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2018), 15-40, 18. 
Contrary to coloniality and neoliberalism in the African context, the institutional theory 
suggests that the pronounced socioeconomic disparities between African and Western 
countries50 highlight the need for an African perspective wherever possible. PERC similarly 
noted growing peaceful resistance and protests against public health and social measures 
in African countr -
specific mitigation of adverse effects to enhance compliance levels and even prevent 
unrests and violence.51  Just like some researchers are increasingly rejecting the conflation 
of Western ideas as universal benchmarks,52 there is therefore the need for decolonisation 
of the African approach to public health and its political and socioeconomic dimensions. 
 
e) International economic system   
 
While the impediments discussed above are largely self-inflicted, the contemporary 
international economic system is an external determinant of public health capacity and 
capability. Noteworthy are neoliberal ideas like free trade and liberalisation championed 
by the World Trade Organisation, the IMF and the World Bank.53 While conventional 
neoliberal wisdom suggests that Africa can pursue foreign investments and trade its way 
out of socioeconomic problems, the unequal international economic system obstructs fair 
competition between developing African countries and developed economies. Existing 
by developed economies54 include the UN General Assembly Resolution 3171,55 New 
International Economic Order,56 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States57 and 
Declaration on the Right to Development58 and Third World Approaches to International 
Law.59 
 
An illustrative segment is international trade and investment law which establishes a 
rules [that] determine who will benefit, who will 
lose and, perhaps more importantly, who will adapt to whom so as to render the policy 
50  
Africa Progress Panel, accessed 7 May 2020, 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/APP_REPORT_2015_FINAL_low1.pdf. 
51  
52 Decolonising Methodologies: Research and 
Indigenous Peoples 2nd Ed (London: Zed, 2012); Eve Darian-Smith, Laws and Societies in Global 
Contexts: Contemporary Approaches. (Cambridge: CUP, 2013). 
53 
in Damien Cahill, Melinda Cooper, Martijn Konings and David Primrose (eds), The SAGE Handbook of 
Neoliberalism (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2018), 16-27. 
54 B.S. Capitalism, Imperialism and International Law in the Twenty-  (2012) 14(1) 
Oregon Rev Intl L 17-45; Kate Miles, The Origins of International Investment Law: Empire, Environment 
and the Safeguarding of Capital, (Cambridge: CUP, 2013); John Linarelli, Margot E. Salomon, and 
Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The Misery of International Law: Confrontations with Global Injustice in 
the Global Economy, (Oxford: OUP, 2018). 
55 Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (17 December 1973) UNGA Res 3171 (XXVIII). 
56 Declaration for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (1 May 1974) UNGA A/RES/S-
6/3201. 
57 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (12 December 1974) UNGA Res 3281 (XXIX). 
58 Declaration on the Right to Development (4 December 1986) UNGA Res 41/128. 
59 Usha Natarajan, John Reynolds, Amar Bhatia and Sujith Xavier, Introduction: TWAIL- on Praxis and the 
 (2016) 37(11) Third World Quarterly 1946-1956. 
goals of trade and investment rules most efficacious .60 Critical international political 
economy61 therefore spotlights the role of international trade and investment law in 
sustaining disparities and inequalities between states and regions, for instance between 
the Global North and the Global South.  Hickel, for exa
countries.62   
 
capability63 are manifest in different ways. Corruption and poor governance in African 
countries are often endorsed by multinational enterprises and other actors from developed 
economies64 that are equally the recipients of the proceeds of corruption. African countries 
are unable to invest on healthcare, which is partly a legacy of Structural Adjustment 
Programmes,65 the Washington Consensus on neoliberalism, heavy debt burden and 
unfavourable international trade. Richer countries have access to cheaper loans that are 
handy for Covid-19 stimulus packages, but African countries66 are charged considerably 
more interest plus other stringent conditions.  
 
The unbalanced international economic system contrasts starkly with the Capability 
Approach and its emphasis on access to opportunities and resources and ability to make 
informed choices and achieve valued objectives.67 Fundamental changes are needed in 
the international economic order to promote fair and accessible opportunities that will 
enable African economies to develop and sustain public health capacity and capability.  
 
III. Conclusion: Reinvigorating Capacity and Capability  
 
Against the backdrop of the current Covid-19 pandemic and with insights from the 
Capability Approach, Institutional Theory, Constructivism, New Regionalism Approach and 
Actor Network Theory, this paper demonstrates the need for appropriate investment and 
fostering an institutional climate for public health in the African continent and indeed 
globally.  A refocused AU for public health is evident in the ACDC-led regional response 
to Covid-19. While the ACDC represents a marked departure from fragmented approaches 
to tackling infectious diseases and demonstrates a viable pan-African approach, the 
60 
 Research 
Handbook on Critical Legal Theory (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2019), 446-472, 446. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Jason Hickel, The Divide: Global Inequality from Conquest to Free Market, (London: Heinemann, 2017). 
63 Julio Faundez and Celine Tan, International Economic Law, Globalization and Developing Countries, 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2010). 
64 -
(2011) 103(1) Journal of Business Ethics 31 57. 
65 Alexander E. Kentikelenis, Thomas H. Stubbs and 
Spending on Health: Evidence from IMF Programs in Low- Social Science 
and Medicine 169
Framewo  (2017) 187 Social Science and Medicine 296 305. 
66 
of IMF Conditionality on Government Health Expenditure: A Cross-National Analysis of 16 West African 
 (2017) 174 Social Science and Medicine 220 227; Thomas Stubbs and Alexander Kentikelenis. 
Low-  (2018) 28(2) Critical Public Health 132 139. 
67 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom
Philosophy and Public Affairs 315-356. 
fragility of public health institutions and socioeconomic environments seriously question 
-induced obstacles include inadequate 
health funding, poor governance and a culture of dependence that includes coloniality and 
neoliberalism.  
 
The AU can play vital roles in developing workable African public health perspectives and 
strengthening the capacities of regional, sub-regional and national authorities. The 
preamble to the AU Constitu necessary measures to strengthen 
our common institutions and provide them with the necessary powers and resources to 
a wider purpose since these are critical to economic development even in the case of 
public health.68 It has been shown that disease burdens impede development in African 
countries. Improvements in public health capacity and capability can therefore assist in 
reducing poverty and promoting development in African countries.  
 
On the other hand, the neoliberal international economic system is an external trigger for 
structural issues in 
health capacity and capability. Covid-19 has demonstrated that ineffective health 
infrastructure in a country or region potentially exposes the rest of the world to crises of 
disastrous proportions. 
 
 
  
68 -2) The American Journal 
of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene 85-
Nature 680-685. 
